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Abstract
The exact contours of international organisations‟ (IO) responsibility have not yet
been clearly defined. While IOs – and international financial institutions (IFIs) in
particular – have in the past avoided drawing those contours in more certain terms,
this position is slowly changing: IFIs have been changing expectations about their
standards of conduct, as reflected in their evolving operational policies and
procedures (OP&P). This report provides an overview of the content, formulation,
adoption, amendment and enforcement of OP&P at multilateral development banks
(MDB) (a subset of IFIs). It highlights the impact of three developments that are
strengthening the normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P,
namely: broadening stakeholder participation in OP&P revision processes;
„hardening‟ or legalization of OP&P through the compliance procedures of
independent accountability mechanisms (IAM) – now widely established at MDBs;
and the emerging enforcement potential of the IAMs.
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Inter-American Development Bank
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1.

Introduction

A key issue in the debate surrounding the responsibility of international organisations
(IO) concerns the contours of these institutions‟ international legal obligations – or,
what are IOs responsible for; to whom; and how might such obligations be enforced?1
A conventional response to these questions is that, while IOs do have international
legal obligations, including obligations towards individuals,2 the sources and content
of those obligations remain opaque. In addition, the mechanisms for enforcing these
obligations, insofar as they exist at all, remain weak (Horta 2002).3 This argument is
typically substantiated by the fact that IOs are not usually signatories to international
conventions, and particularly not those regulating environmental and human rights
obligations (Clark 2002; Darrow 2006).4
However, as we argue in this report, this position is slowly changing. This
phenomenon can be seen most clearly and dramatically in the case of international
financial institutions (IFIs) (Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010), which will be the
primary focus of this report. Motivated by various external factors (such as pressure
by international civil society and local governments, media scrutiny, and changing
views of corporate responsibility for the adverse effects of actions), IFIs have been
raising their own expectations about their standards of conduct (Danaher (ed. 1994);
Shihata 2000; Alfredsson & Ring (eds.) 2001; Clark et al. 2003; Head (2004); and
Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010).

1

See Scott 2000, at 38, raising the notion that the accountability issue has to be analysed from various

perspectives; this approach also reflected in the ILA‟s 2004 report on the Accountability of
International Organisations.
2

See e.g., 2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, MR, at para. 16 (the Bank repeating

the (then) standard WB position that the Bank‟s mandate only covered socio-economic rights
obligations towards individuals, and not civil and political human rights. The Inspection Panel pointed
out that „human rights‟ (making no distinction between categories of rights) were „implicitly embedded
in various policies of the Bank‟ (2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, IP
Chairperson Address, at 8).
3

Also see section 3.2 below.

4

Note that IOs are frequently signatories of treaties concerning financial or economic topics (e.g.,

development, trade, investment) – see e.g., Klabbers 2002, at 40-42; and Alvarez 2005 at 273-337.
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Both the source and the expression of these heightened expectations is the
operational policies and procedures (OP&P) of IFIs, which are internal documents
that contain prescriptions („rules‟, „guidelines‟ and „procedures‟) – addressed to both
IFI staff and external parties, such as borrowers – concerning the manner in which the
operations of the organisation ought to be performed. Hence, the OP&P cover a wide
range of functional areas, such as environmental and social safeguards, procedures to
be followed when assessing, designing and implementing development projects, and
technical details such as disbursing funds, preparing for missions etc.5 OP&P could be
– and increasingly are – compared to administrative rules and procedures found in
domestic law, and as such is evolving into, what is called by some, „global
administrative law‟ (Kingsbury et al. 2005; Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 2010).
Moreover, as this report illustrates, the normative significance and
enforcement potential of the OP&P are being enhanced through regular internal
policy revision processes and the evolving practice of „Independent Accountability
Mechanisms‟ (IAMs). IAMs, now present in some form at most IFIs, are internal
bodies with varying (although significant) degrees of institutional independence that
are tasked with investigating and/or resolving complaints from people who claim that
they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the failure of the IFI to comply
with its OP&P (Shihata 2000; Bradlow 2005; Van Putten 2008). Some of them are
also mandated to provide advice to the IFI on the further development of its OP&P.6
In other words, the emphasis of the debate concerning the contours of the
international legal obligations of IOs seems to have shifted over the past two decades
or so from „getting them to comply‟ with international standards, such as human
rights standards (especially those contained in the ICCPR) in the abstract, to getting
IOs to incorporate or „mainstream‟ international human rights and environmental
standards into their operations.7 In this sense, IOs – and the IFIs in particular – are

5
6

For more detail, see section 2.1 below.
These compliance procedures may be triggered internally (e.g., by the IO‟s Executive Board or

President), by state parties (e.g., in case of a treaty body), or by other external stakeholders (e.g., NGOs
or individuals). For a comparative perspective on various institutional aspects of the IAMs, see
Bradlow & Naudé Fourie, in Hale & Held (eds.), forthcoming.
7

A sentiment consistently echoed in various initiatives surrounding the UN‟s Millennium

Development Goals – see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
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truly becoming law-making bodies through the manner in which they draft, interpret
and apply their OP&P (Alvarez 2006).

1.1

This report

The report focuses on the OP&P of a subset of IFIs, namely, the Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs), which specifically includes: the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association
(IDA) – the „World Bank‟ (WB);8 the International Finance Corporation (IFC);9 the
Inter-American Development Bank (IBD);10 the Asian Development Bank (ADB);11
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); 12 and the African
Development Bank (AfDB).13
The motivation behind this emphasis is twofold. First, OP&P at the MDBs
have reached a level of detail and scope yet to be reached by most other IOs. For
example, the World Bank already had a policy on indigenous people – the WB‟s
Operational Manual Statement „Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects – in 1982
(Kingsbury 1999, at 342; Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010, at 202-204).
Second, the MDBs all have existing IAMs that have undergone a fair degree of
institutional development and have amassed a significant body of „jurisprudence‟ over
the past decade or so.14

8

See

http://www.worldbank.org/,

with

emphasis

on

the

WB‟s

Inspection

Panel

(IP)

(http://www.inspectionpanel.org).
9

See http://www.ifc.org/, with emphasis on the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO)

(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/).
10

http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/about-the-inter-american-development-bank,5995.html,

with

emphasis on the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (MICI – as per the Spanish
acronym)

and

its

predecessor,

the

Independent

Investigation

Mechanism

(http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigation-mechanism-mici,1752.html).
11

http://www.adb.org/default.asp, with emphasis on the Accountability Mechanism (AM)

(http://www.adb.org/Accountability-Mechanism/default.asp).
12

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/homepage.shtml, with emphasis on the Project Complaint Mechanism

(PCM)

and

its

predecessor,

the

Independent

Recourse

Mechanism

(http://www.ebrd.com/russian/pages/about/principles/integrity/pcm.shtml).
13

http://www.afdb.org/en/, with emphasis on the Independent Review Mechanism (IRM)

(http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/).
14

See below, note 58.
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The report will provide a general overview of the content of OP&Ps, their
formulation, adoption, amendment („rule-making procedures‟) and their enforcement.
It will highlight three developments that are arguably strengthening the normative
significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P, namely: the broadening
stakeholder participation in OP&P revision processes; the „hardening‟ or legalization
of OP&P through IAM compliance procedures; and the emerging enforcement
potential of the IAMs. The report will conclude with a few preliminary observations.

2.

Overview of operational policies and procedures
at multi-lateral development banks

This section provides an overview of the functional content covered by OP&P at the
MDBs (2.1), followed by a brief description of the procedures by which OP&P are
formulated, adopted and amended (2.2) as well as enforced (2.3). For a structured
comparison between the MDBs, see Appendix 7.1 below.

2.1

Content

Over time, the OP&P at MDBs have come to cover all functional areas flowing from
the main objectives of these institutions, which can be summarized as the provision of
lending products and related expertise – in line with the MDBs‟ development
strategies – that support both development projects and programmes in their member
states.15 Consequently, the OP&P of MDBs typically govern the appraisal, design and
implementation of development projects and programmes; as well as the anticipation,
prevention and mitigation of various potential adverse effects that may flow from
these activities.

2.1.1

Classifying OP&P

MDBs employ combinations of different categorizations for their OP&P, such as
sector-specific (e.g., forestry and mining) vs. cross-sectoral policies (e.g., anticorruption and procurement policies) and country/region-specific policies (e.g.,

15

For a historic overview of the development of OP&Ps at the WB, see Shihata 2000, at 2-14;

Kingsbury 1999, at 324-325; and Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 2010, at 202-209.
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regional and sub-regional cooperation). The most common classifications, however,
are functional in nature.16 For example:
(1) „safeguard‟ policies that aim to manage various social and environmental
risks inherent in development projects, and to ensure sustainable development
(e.g., policies on environmental impact assessments, indigenous people,
involuntary resettlement);
(2) public information disclosure policies, clarifying which project-related
information must be made available to different stakeholders (e.g., project
affected people (PAP) or civil society), and at what stage of the project cycle;
(3) management and project supervision policies, which set out MDB
obligations (often vis-à-vis the borrower) in the appraisal, design, and
implementation of development projects;
(4) policies detailing the procedures concerning the MDB‟s independent
accountability mechanism (IAM), as well as other internal and external
accountability and development effectiveness measures (e.g., procurement
policies, and policies ensuring institutional integrity, detecting fraud and
corruption);17
(5) policies aiding staff in the development and application of its lending
products (e.g., lending eligibility and terms);
(6) policies aimed at higher strategic levels in the MDB, such as regional,
country and sector-specific strategy policies that aim to assist the MDB in its
formulation of development strategies (e.g., country assistance management,
poverty reduction).
Another useful classification increasingly being employed by MDBs concerns
the differentiation between borrower and. MDB obligations.18 The blurred lines of

16

Another classification might relate to the substantive vs. procedural elements in policies. While most

OP&P contain both substantive and procedural elements, some focus more on procedural issues (e.g.,
policies setting standards concerning stakeholder consultation and public disclosure of project-related
information).
17

Note that the IAMs‟ „founding documents‟ detailing their operating procedures did not necessarily

start out as part of the MDBs‟ set of OP&P. For instance, the WBIP‟s founding Resolution and 1996 &
1999 Board Clarifications on the Resolution were only later formally incorporated into the Bank‟s
OP&P structure as BP 17.55 (with Resolution and Board Clarifications Annexes to the BP).
18

MDBs might also differentiate between policies aimed at public sector vs. private sector clients.
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responsibility between Banks and borrowers – essentially, where obligations of both
are stipulated in the same OP&P – has been a consistent contentious issue (Shihata
2000, at 13) in the history of OP&P evolution. By adopting separate OP&P (on
similar functional areas) for the MDB and its borrowers (or „clients‟) respectively,
some of the banks have started to address this problem – especially with regards to
their private sector clients.19
An intriguing development is the emergence of a tiered structure among the
OP&P that might even be suggestive of a legal hierarchy.20 Formal designations differ
among the institutions but, roughly speaking, MDBs appear to organize their OP&Ps
into two levels or tiers. „Policies‟,21 „procedures‟,22 „directives‟,23 or „performance
standards‟24 that establish norms with which MDB staff and borrowers are required to
19

See e.g., the IFC‟s set of „Performance Standards for Private Sector Clients‟ vis-à-vis its „Policy on

Social

and

Environmental

Sustainability‟,

„Disclosure

Policy‟,

and

the

„Compliance

Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)‟ policy, which details only its own (MDB) obligations. Also see Daniel
D. Bradlow and Megan S. Chapman, “Public Participation and the Private Sector: The Role of
Multilateral Development Banks and the Evolving Legal Standards”, Erasmus Law Review
(forthcoming).
20

See e.g., Klabbers 2002, at 224-226 on the significance of hierarchy among IO „legislative

instruments‟ or „legal acts‟.
21

See e.g., WB definition: „Operational Policies (OPs) are short, focused statements that follow from

the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the general conditions, and policies approved by the Board. OPs
establish the parameters for the conduct of operations; they also describe the circumstances under
which exceptions to policy are admissible and spell out who authorizes exceptions.‟
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,c
ontentMDK:20249090~menuPK:64701643~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00
.html).
22

See e.g., WB definition: „Bank Procedures (BPs) explain how Bank staff carry out the policies set

out in the OPs. They spell out the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bankwide
consistency

and

quality.‟

(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,c
ontentMDK:20249090~menuPK:64701643~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00
.html).
23

WB Directives contained both binding and non-binding elements, which lead to some confusion

among staff, and a primary reason that was given for the OP/BP conversion process – see note 25,
below.
24

See e.g., IFC definition: „IFC's Performance Standards define clients' roles and responsibilities for

managing their projects and the requirements for receiving and retaining IFC support. The standards
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comply and, thus, in a sense are „binding‟ might be considered as „upper tier‟
OP&P.25 „Staff guidelines‟ or „guideline notes‟, „practice notes‟,26 or „best practices‟27
might be described as „lower tier‟ OP&P, since staff are encouraged to respect them
(as they will arguably assist staff in making better operational decisions), but MDB
staff are given discretion to deviate from these lower tier OP&P. The significance of
this hierarchy is also illustrated by differences concerning their formulation and
enforcement, as the remaining sub-sections will illustrate.28

2.2

Formulation, adoption and amendment

The OP&P are formally the products of the MDBs. Their staff compile drafts based
on whatever input is deemed relevant (e.g., reports from quality assurance or
operations evaluation departments and/or external sources such as civil society and
include

requirements

to

disclose

information.‟

(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards).
25

Note that in terms of this hierarchy, the WB‟s OP/BP classification both fall within the top tier. Both

OPs and BPs are „binding‟ on staff and borrowers (as relevant); BPs contain more detail than their
counterpart OPs. On criticism of the WB‟s reclassification process of Directives and Operational
Policy Statements to the OP/BP structure, see e.g., P. Bosshard, J. Bruil, K. Horta et al., Gambling with
People‟s Lives: What the World Bank‟s New “High Risk/High-Reward” Strategy Means for the Poor
and the Environment, at 39 (2003); and see Clark 2002 at 221: „The Bank‟s systematic process of
weakening its policy framework represents another internal rebellion against the rule of law. The
“reformatting” of Bank policies is generally viewed by these outside experts as an attempt to shield the
Bank from accountability through the Inspection Panel process.‟
26

See e.g., IFC definition: „The Guidance Notes are companion documents to IFC's Performance

Standards and provide additional guidance to clients (and IFC staff) in fulfilling their roles and
responsibilities

under

the

standards.‟

(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards).
27

See e.g., the EBRD‟s description of its „Sub-sectoral environmental and social guidelines‟: The

EBRD has developed a set of sub-sectoral environmental and social guidelines to assist
credit/investment officers in local financial institutions and other non-environmental experts. They are
designed to help in identifying major environmental and social activity risks, important management
actions, and essential aspects of environmental and social due diligence. The guidelines are not part of
the

Bank's

Environmental

and

Social

Procedures

and

are

used

as

guidance

only.‟

(http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/what/policies/guidelines.shtml). Also see the AfDB‟s set of OP&P,
listing

a

mixture

of

„policies‟

and

„guidelines‟

on

their

website:

http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/policy-documents/guidelines-and-procedures/.
28

See sections 2.2 and 2.3 below.
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academia). These draft new policies or proposed revisions of existing ones,
particularly if they involve significant aspects of MDB operational policies (for
example so-called „safeguard policies‟) may be made available for public comment
and then considered and formally adopted by the relevant internal organs, usually
either the Bank‟s Board of Executive Directors, or its senior management, such as the
Bank‟s chief executive officer.29
However, this formal position is being changed by evolving practice. While
official adoption and amendment procedures remain intact, informal rule-making
processes that involve extensive stakeholder participation are becoming more
common, as the next section will illustrate.

2.2.2. Evolving OP&P review processes
The lack of (effective) public participation in the review of existing OP&P –
especially by those who are affected most by the OP&P – has been a consistent point
of criticism aimed at MDBs in the past (Kingsbury 1999, at 324-325; Boisson de
Chazournes 1999). The MDBs have gradually started to respond to these comments,
although not without eliciting additional criticism about the effectiveness of increased
participation. The WB‟s revision of its Indigenous Peoples Directive in the 1990s, for
example, was widely criticized for effectively „watering down‟ policy requirements
even though the Bank initiated a wide consultation process beforehand (Hunter at 199
in Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010).30
Notwithstanding the mixed success of stakeholder participation in past OP&P
reviews, a few noticeable trends can be discerned from more recent developments.
The most evident observation is that most of the OP&P revision processes currently
underway or recently completed involved invitations for public participation as part of
the review process. For instance, public participation was involved in the WB‟s

29

E.g., most of the WB‟s OP&P are issued „under the authority of the [Bank‟s] President‟, by the

relevant senior Bank management member (Shihata 2000, at 41).
30

In addition, when the WB‟s Board of Directors reviewed the Resolution that established the

Inspection Panel in 1996 and 1999, it involved external stakeholders in both instances – see Shihata
2000 at 155-203 and Bradlow 1999. Also note that the IMF has reviewed its conditionality policy a few
years ago, for which it followed a public consultation process.
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recently concluded major revision of its Disclosure of Information Policy;31 in the
IFC‟s current review of its Policy and Performance Standards on Social and
Environmental Sustainability and Policy on Disclosure of Information (jointly known
as its „Sustainability Framework‟), which is expected to be implemented by early
2011;32 in the AfDB‟s review of its accountability mechanism in June 2010;33 and
was part of the IDB‟s review of its policy regulating its IAM in 201034 and its
Environment and Safeguards Policy between 2004 and 2006.35 The ABD‟s current
review of its Accountability Mechanism Policy and Public Communication Policy
(with target completion dates slated for the first half of 2011) provides for public
participation;36 as does the EBRD‟s recent review of its IAM – re-launched in early
2010 as the „Project Complaint Mechanism‟.37 Public participation was also a feature
of all nine completed WB policy reviews38 and its one ongoing review39 since 2002.

31

Effective since 1 July 2010. The new policy makes a significant portion of documents available (e.g.,

minutes of Board meetings), and works on the principle that „that the World Bank will disclose any
information in its possession that is not on a list of exceptions‟ (compared to working with a list of
documents that are available to the public). Another change of note is the possibility of appeal, should
an individual be refused access to a particular document. See WB Press Release No. 2010/448/EXC of
3 June 2010, New World Bank Access to Information Policy Takes Effect July 1 at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:22105228~menuPK:51455649~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.
html.
32

See http://www.ifc.org/policyreview.

33

See http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/.

34

This review resulted in the replacement of the IDB‟s Independent Investigation Mechanism with the

new

Independent

Consultation

and

Investigation

Mechanism

in

February

2010

–

see

http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigation-mechanism-mici,1752.html.
35

See http://www.iadb.org/features-and-web-stories/2004-11/english/feedback-sought-on-new-idb-

environment-and-safeguards-policy-2179.html.
36

See http://www.adb.org/AM-REview/. The ADB also revised the policy on their IAM substantially

in 2001 – see Hunter at 226 in Bradlow & Hunter 2010.
37

For more detail on enforcement-related changes made to the EBRD‟s IAM, see section 3.2 below.

38

I.e., Adjustment Lending to Development Policy Lending (2002-04); Conditionality (2007); Country

Systems in Bank-Supported Operations (2007); Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) (2006-2007);
GAC Implementation Plans (2007); Monitoring and Evaluation Policy (2006); Eligibility of
Expenditures in World Bank Lending (2003-04); Use of Country Systems for procurement (2008); and
the Volcker Report on Department of Institutional Integrity (2007).
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In general these OP&P reviews seem to be the result of the institutions‟
genuine need for their OP&P to reflect evolving practice and the realization that the
content of the OP&P has to be updated and refined in the light of the lessons in MDB
operations. The relevance of public participation in this process is reflected in this
WB statement:
The World Bank solicits feedback from different stakeholders prior to the adoption of new or
significantly changed sector or thematic strategies, policies or other documents that affect
Bank operations. The objectives are to capture the experience and knowledge of various
audiences, to give voice to the poor, and to increase transparency and citizen involvement in
development decision making […]. Through consultations, the World Bank Group is able to
tap into a broad range of perspectives. It strives to integrate comments and new ideas into its
operations, policies and final documents. 40

This statement also highlights that fact broad stakeholder participation, in fact,
is becoming a regular part of the review process. All OP&P revisions identified above
involve(d) extensive, pre-announced consultation programmes involving external
stakeholders, over extended periods of time.41
The IFC‟s review of its Sustainability Framework serves as a particularly good
example.42 A separate section of the IFC‟s website has been dedicated to the review,
with the timeline, consultation process, milestones and outcomes clearly defined, and
all (interim) documentation surrounding the review easily accessible. Consultation is
opened to any party, which can register for various sessions held around the world

39

I.e.,

the

World

Bank‟s

Whistle-blowing

Policy,

available

at

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21624514~pagePK:6425704
3~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
40

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21807601~menuPK:506
8208~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html. MDBs have also become increasingly
convinced of the link between „process rights and development effectiveness‟ – see Hunter in Bradlow
& Hunter 2010, at 209-211.
41

For a description of an evolving eight-stage policy-making process, see Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter

2010, at 223-232.
42

See above, note 32.

12

during each stage of the three-phased process,43 and comments on draft policy
versions from previous stages of the process are facilitated via the website.44
To conclude, while public participation in these rule-making processes has
still not been formalized or „codified‟ in a „policy about policies‟,45 current OP&P
reviews seem to have embedded stakeholder consultation in MDB practice.

2.3

Enforcement mechanisms

All MDBs have established fairly extensive institutional frameworks to ensure
consistent enforcement of the OP&P throughout their institutions and across all their
borrowers. For instance, a variety of internal bodies have been put in place to ensure
institutional compliance, such as departments charged with ensuring more systemic
compliance46 (e.g., evaluations departments that take a retroactive view and quality
assurance departments that take a proactive view on compliance performance of
individual projects) and others mandated specifically to investigate specific instances
of alleged non-compliance (e.g., institutional integrity units and IAMs through their
compliance functions, although non-compliance might also come to light in the course
of their problem solving stages).47 As far as the institutional mandate of the IAMs is
concerned, it is important to note that it is usually limited to „upper level‟ OP&P (or
certain subsets within it, such as safeguard policies).48 Hence, it is controversial when
an MDB „deregulates‟ certain aspects of a policy to the „lower level‟ OP&P as it
effectively narrows the IAM‟s enforcement mandate.49

43

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/ConsultationEventsRegistration.

44

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/ProvideInput.

45

For arguments supporting the „codification of administrative procedures at IFIs‟, see Hunter in

Bradlow & Hunter 2010, at 232-237.
46

Interestingly, the WB is currently conducting a review of all five of its internal independent

evaluation and review mechanisms.
47

IAMs, with the exception of the WB‟s IP, typically fulfil two functions: dispute-resolution in a

„problem-solving phase‟ and compliance assurance in a „compliance phase‟ – see Bradlow & Naudé
Fourie, in Hale & Hand (eds.) forthcoming.
48

E.g., the WB IP Mandate‟s specifically excludes the Best Practice Guidelines „and similar documents

or statements‟ (Inspection Panel 1993 Resolution, para. 12); however, all IAMs‟ mandates cover
„safeguard or sustainable development‟ OP&P (see above, section 2.1.1).
49

See above, note 25.
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A point of criticism made in this context has been the lack of internal
sanctions used against Bank staff in cases of proven non-compliance, especially in
cases of findings more systemic non-compliance.50 While this is a valid concern as it
points to the question of the effective functioning of IAMs and to MDB staff and
management‟s perception of the IAMs, this criticism must be viewed in context.
Although it is certainly possible that there are cases of „repeat offenders‟ among staff,
it is more likely that the major problems concerning OP&P compliance arise from the
complexity of the projects being funded by the MDBs, staff uncertainty about how to
apply the policies (which, in turn, is sometimes caused by mixed messages from
management),51 gaps in the available knowledge, or staff succumbing to time and cost
pressures.
Borrower compliance with OP&P, on the other hand, is generally ensured by
(the threat of) legal sanctions (such as suspension of loan disbursements, or
withdrawal of the loan) since the relevant OP&P are typically incorporated into the
loan agreement between bank and borrower. MDBs have been criticized in the past
for not employing these enforcement strategies in face of glaring borrower noncompliance; or at least not consistently, leading to the unequal treatment of
borrowers.52
Interestingly, all MDBs specifically mention their public information
disclosure policies as a crucial element of their compliance framework – the logic
being that increased transparency (and the increased public scrutiny following from
this) leads to better conditions for ensuring institutional compliance with OP&P. The
trend certainly has been to disclose more information over the years. In fact, the WB‟s
recently amended „Access to Information Policy‟ adopted an even broader approach:

50

An exception would be institutional integrity cases where individuals are held accountable for fraud

allegations, etc.
51

E.g., in the WB IP‟s 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project case, the Panel noted „an

unusually and disturbingly wide range of divergent and, often, opposing views‟ between Bank staff –
including senior management – „on how the Bank‟s operational policies and procedures should be
applied.‟ (IR (ES), para. 9).
52

See below, note 68. The WB‟s IP also picked up on this problem in the 1999 China Western Poverty

Reduction Project case, noting recurring staff opinions that „in China things are done differently‟ (IR
(ES), para. 14).
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project-related information is in principle available to the public, with the exception
of a few specific documents.53
Clearly, as have been illustrated by some of the examples mentioned above,
the mere existence of such enforcement mechanisms says very little about their
effectiveness. This issue, and particularly the role that IAMs are playing in the
realizing the enforcement potential of the OP&P, will be discussed in more detail in
the next section.

3.

Strengthening the normative significance and

enforcement potential of the OP&P
This report argues that, although there remains much scope for improvement,54 the
normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P at MDBs are being
strengthened as a result of three major developments in the evolution of the OP&P,
namely: increased public scrutiny of the OP&P through enhanced stakeholder
participation in the OP&P review process (discussed in section 2.2.2. above); a
“hardening” of the OP&P as a result of IAM compliance procedures (discussed in
section 3.1 below); and ongoing institutional development occurring at most IAMs,
resulting in a potential enhancement of their enforcement role (discussed in section
3.2 below).

3.1

“Hardening”

the

OP&P

through

IAM

compliance

procedures
The potential of the OP&P to evolve into more than mere norms that promote better
standards in MDB operations has long been recognised (Kingsbury 1999), which
means that they can be used to hold MDBs responsible for their actions and even
contribute to the normative development of international law in particular areas. This
conclusion followed from the fact that the IAMs, in exercising their compliance
review mandates,55 logically had to interpret the OP&P in order to determine whether
or not the MDBs have been in compliance with the provisions in question.
53

See above, note 31.

54

See section 4 below.

55

This section will focus on the compliance procedures / phases of the IAMs, not the problem-solving

phase that usually precedes it.
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Prior to the establishment of the IAMs, this interpretative function was the
exclusive responsibility of the MDB management and staff, including the Banks‟
legal departments, which would be asked to interpret the policies whenever a
particular issue implicated the Bank‟s legal obligations.56 The establishment of the
IAMs created the potential for the IAMs and the Management and staff to follow
different interpretations of the OP&Ps, which are drafted in relatively broad language
and often without great detail or precision on how they should be applied. These
differences in interpretation compel the institutional entity responsible for final
approval of the IAM‟s compliance review reports (usually, the Bank‟s Board of
Executive Directors) to decide which OP&P interpretation to accept. This is a new
function for the MDB‟s Boards of Directors and has created a challenge for them
because they often feel ill-equipped to choose between the different interpretations.
However, as we will illustrate below, it can be argued that the IAMs‟
interpretations of particular OP&P have come to carry increasing weight within the
institutions, especially in the World Bank context (Shihata 2000; Naudé Fourie 2009,
at 193-250). We suggest that the primary contribution of the IAMs in enhancing the
normative significance of the OP&P is their „hardening‟ or, „legalization‟ of the
OP&P through the exercise of their compliance review mandate.57 Such a claim is
potentially difficult to substantiate without employing a sound analytical framework,
such as the conceptual model describing the legalization process developed by Abbot
et al. This model identifies three dimensions of legalization, namely: „obligation‟ (the
extent to which an actor is „legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that
their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures,
and discourse of international law‟); „precision‟ (whether the „rules unambiguously
define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe‟); and „delegation‟ (i.e., third
parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to
56

IAMs have to consult Bank‟s legal department about interpretation of OP&P, but only when it‟s a

question of MDB legal obligations. See e.g., WB IP 1999 Resolution, para. 15.
57

Note that the term „legalization‟ does not necessarily have a positive connotation in the IAM context.

During the early years of the WBIP, the Panel – and external commentators – often accused Bank
management of being overly „legalistic‟, i.e., formalistically sticking to the letter of the IP Resolution
or specific OP&P provisions. See e.g., See 1995 Tanzania Power IV Project, ER, at para. 8; 1996
Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, Review & Assessment, at 48-49; and 2005
Cambodia Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, IR (ES) at 22-23.
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resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules‟) (Abbot et al., in Goldstein et
al. (eds.) 2001, at 17-34). Moreover, the model contends that each of these dimensions
form a continuum, which allow for relative comparisons between different norms and
(quasi-) legal entities responsible for normative development – see Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Dimensions of legalization

We use this model to analyse the extent to which the IAMs have “legalized”
the OP&P. In other words: are the IAMs contributing to the strengthening of the
OP&P from expressly non-legal forms to stronger, binding rules (obligation)? Are
they strengthening particular OP&P provisions from being vague principles to
stronger elaborate rules (precision)? And are the IAMs, through their persistence in
interpreting the OP&P, also gradually moving the MDBs to accept a model where the
normative development of the OP&P is increasingly being entrusted to the IAMs
(delegation)?
It might be argued that the IAMs have had an insufficient number of
compliance reviews („jurisprudence‟) to answer these questions conclusively. This is
particular applicable to the IAMs at the regional development banks, most of which
have recently undergone institutional review and reform (as section 3.2 will
elaborate). The World Bank‟s Inspection Panel (WBIP), on the other hand, which has
been active since 1994 and has not undergone an institutional review since 1999, has
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accumulated a fair number of compliance review cases.58 The Panel has furthermore
been the subject of a fair amount of research. The remainder of this section will
therefore use the WBIP as basis for the analysis.

3.1.1

Illustrative: The World Bank’s Inspection Panel

Strengthening the obligatory nature of OP&P
It appears that substantial confusion exists among WB Bank staff, management and
Board members about the nature of OP&Ps: are they „strict marching orders‟ to be
closely followed by Bank staff and borrowers,59 or do they allow for considerable
leeway, or „managerial discretion‟?60 This uncertainty was clearly demonstrated in the
IP‟s landmark China Qinghai case (1999-2000). The Panel acknowledged that the
OP&P (most still styled as „directives‟ at that point) did allow for some managerial
discretion, but insisted that
the directives cannot possibly be taken to authorize a level of “interpretation” and “flexibility”
that would permit those who must follow these directives to simply override the portions of
the directives that are clearly binding.61

WB management in turn criticized the Inspection Panel‟s position, arguing that
„[m]any of the Panel‟s findings appear […] to be based on an application of elements
of each policy as legally binding rules, allowing for little or no flexibility or room for
judgement‟.62 The case itself did not put a conclusive end to the debate, but it proved
to be indicative of what was to come: while the Bank continued to clarify the
obligatory nature of its OP&P through the so-called conversion process into

58

As of March 2010, the WBIP has registered 71 compliance review cases. Compare this with the

ADB (3 compliance review cases since 2003); IDB (7 compliance review cases in total); AfDB (6
requests for both compliance reviews and problem solving); and EBRD (4 requests since new
mechanism was adopted in 2010). The possible exception would the IFC‟s CAO, which, as of March
2011, has registered over 50 cases (with 11 cases going to compliance review) since its inception.
59

Shihata 2000, at 41-49.

60

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR (ES), at para. 15.

61

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR (ES), at para. 11.

62

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, MR, at paras. 2.2.2 & 2.4; and MR to IR, at para.

20.

18

OP/BP/GP,63 the Panel persisted in its approach of setting out the contours of
managerial discretion – as the next point will illustrate.
The language of some of the OP&P makes it clear that they allow for some
„professional judgement‟ or „managerial discretion‟.64 On the one hand, this flexibility
in the text allows the IP to adopt expansive interpretation techniques.65 On the other
hand, it erodes the obligatory nature of the OP&P. There are numerous examples in
the IP‟s investigation reports of instances where the IP has explicitly delineated (and
as a practical result, effectively limited) management discretion. For instance, the IP
repeatedly rejected WB management‟s arguments that the exercise of its legal
remedies against the borrower was „not a requirement but a discretionary tool, to be
applied only after other reasonable means of persuasion have failed‟;66 or that it was
„a matter for the judgment of Management, taking into account all the circumstances
of each case‟, and that a decision not to suspend loan disbursements, for example, was
„neither a sign of negligence nor of lack of concern‟.67 The IP rejected these
arguments in a number of cases, countering that its founding Resolution explicitly
listed as „an instance of failure in the compliance of Bank policies and procedures
situations where the Bank has “failed in its follow-up on the borrower‟s obligations
under loan agreements with respect to such policies or procedures”‟. 68 Another
example where the Panel has repeatedly challenged Managerial discretion, and thus
strengthened the obligatory nature of the relevant provisions, concerns the
environmental screening of projects. Over the years, the Panel has questioned the
screening of several projects that Bank Management has deemed to be lower risk
(„category B‟) and found the project to be in non-compliance with the relevant OP&P

63

See above, note 25.

64

See below, note 72.

65

See Naudé Fourie 2009, at 231-244.

66

1996 Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, MR, at para. 1.8.

67

1997 India NTPC Power Generation Project, MR, at 3. Also see 1995 Brazil Rodônia Natural

Resources Management Project, MR, at para. 4.
68

1996 Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, ER, at paras. 30-31. Also see 1995 Brazil

Rodônia Natural Resources Management Project, Additional Review, at paras. 55-56; 1997 India
NTPC Power Generation Project, MR, at para. 3. Compare to 2004 India Mumbai Urban Road
Transport, where the Bank exercised one of its legal rights (suspension of funds) in the light of the
Inspection Panel‟s findings (India Mumbai Urban Road Transport, MR to IR, at para. 89).
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since it should have been classified as a higher environmental risk project („category
A‟).69 Importantly, the IP rejected Bank management‟s claim that the environmental
screening of projects was solely a management prerogative for which there cannot be
a consistent interpretation, since
[s]creening a project into either Category A or B requires judgement about the overall risks
(type of project, location, environmental sensitivity) of the project as well as the nature and
magnitude of potential impacts. How the risks and impacts are judged depends on the specific
project involved.70

The Panel‟s consistent counterargument has been that the appropriateness of a
particular environmental screening depended on a „straightforward‟ interpretation of
the particular OP&P provisions, which was exactly what the Panel did when it
conducted its compliance review.71
Adding to the precision of particular OP&P provisions
Like all rules with normative content, OP&P contain concepts and phrases that are
(often deliberately) vague – i.e., they require interpretation in order to strengthen their
precision with regards to a particular case or in order to have broader application.72

69

See e.g., 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project; 2004 Pakistan National Drainage

Program Project; and 2005 Cambodia Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project.
There were also a number of projects where the IP concurred with Management‟s project classification,
although it specifically reviewed whether the classification was in line with the OP&P in those
instances – see e.g., 1999 Kenya Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (the Panel
concurred with Management‟s categorization of „B‟); 1999 Ecuador Mining Development and
Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (the Panel concurred with Management‟s
categorization of ‟A‟); 2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project (the Panel concurred
with Management‟s categorization of „A‟); 2001 Uganda Third Power Project, Fourth Power Project,
and proposed Bujagali Hydropower Project (the Panel concurred with Management‟s categorization of
„B‟); and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project
(the Panel concurred with Management‟s categorization of „A‟).
70

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, Request, at 4; and MR, at 64

71

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 152.

72

Consider, e.g., these phrases from OP&P: „[t]he Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or

compensatory measures, whenever feasible‟ (OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), at para. 2
(emphasis added); and „the Bank satisfies itself that the borrower has explored all viable alternative
project designs to avoid physical displacement of these [indigenous] groups. When it is not feasible to
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The IP‟s growing jurisprudence is making a significant contribution to making several
of these concepts and phrases more precise, and thereby also clarifying the obligations
of the WB towards PAP. For instance, the phrase „meaningful and informed
consultation‟ comes up in several of the Bank‟s OP&P, and has lead to
misunderstandings and widely differing expectations between Bank staff and PAP.73
Over the years, the Panel has shaped the substantive and procedural content of this
phrase, often describing what it was not.74 Specifically, the Panel ruled on several
occasions that it wasn‟t good enough for Bank management merely to confirm that
consultation „has taken place‟75 as the content of those consultation sessions were of
paramount importance. For instance, „information sessions‟ did not constitute
„meaningful consultations‟. As the Panel commented in the 1999 Ecuador Mining
Development case:
It is worth noting that Management does not categorize these meetings „to consult‟ but rather
as meetings “to inform” […]. In the Panel‟s view, Management‟s approach to consultation
was unfortunate. If there was proper CONSULTATION, “[c]onducted in the spirit of the
OD”, Management could have addressed these concerns long ago or prevented many of the
issues raised by the Requesters.76

The very notion of „compliance‟ is another example where the IP added a
degree of precision through its substantive and procedural development of the

avoid such displacement, preference is given to land-based resettlement strategies […].‟ (OP 4.12
(Involuntary Resettlement), at para. 9 (emphasis added).
73

See e.g., 1999 Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance

Project, IR paras. 52, 57 & 103; 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project
and Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project, IR, at paras. 421 & 437; and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water
Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project, IR (ES), at 21 and IR, at para. 240.
74

E.g., consultations could not take place in the presence of government officials and armed guards

(1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, Request, at 9; MR, at 74-75; and IR, at para. 116; and
2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, IR (ES), at paras. 26 & 37); and surveys used
in the consultation process had to guarantee the anonymity of participants (1999 China Western
Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 116).
75

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 116.

76

1999 Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project, IR, at

paras. 52, 57 & 103 (emphasis, in bold, in the original). Also see 2004 India Mumbai Urban Transport
Project, IR, at para. 372; and 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project and
Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project, IR, at para. 421.
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concept. In essence, the Panel argues that a mere „process‟ or formalistic approach to
compliance is typically not enough to ensure that a project is compliant with an
OP&P. For example, an environmental assessment that meets all the formal criteria
set out in the OP&P could still be inadequate when the substantive quality is taken
into account. As the Panel concluded in the China Qinghai case:
[…] in appraising compliance, Management had an obligation to satisfy itself not only that the
process and procedures mandated by the policies had been followed, but also that the work
under review met professionally acceptable standards of quality. In other words, both process
and quality were essential components of compliance.77

Strengthening the delegation of interpretative functions
This dimension of legalization is arguably the weakest of the three since the IP is not
solely tasked with providing authoritative interpretations of the OP&P; and, as many
of the examples mentioned in this section illustrated, Bank management and the IP
frequently supports entirely opposite interpretation. Formally speaking, the
interpretation that stands will be the one accepted by the Bank‟s Board of Executive
Directors. However, to the extent that the Board continues its practice of usually
accepting the Inspection Panel‟s Investigations Reports without specific comment,
this procedure does not necessarily clarify the particular position.78 Whether Bank
management and staff actually accept the delegation of interpretative functions to the
IP might also be questioned, as the phenomenon of „panel proofing‟ (i.e., actions
taken by Bank staff simply to avoid or limit an Inspection Panel investigation)
illustrates.79
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Panel‟s interpretations of OP&P
have steadily gained in credibility over the years – compare, for instance, earlier
Management Responses (MR) to IP investigation reports (where most Panel findings
were rejected, with very little remedial action being proposed or undertaken by the
Bank in light of the IP reports) with later MRs that acknowledge most Panel

77

1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at paras. 180- 186.

78

See e.g., Shihata 2000, at 37-41 on early controversy regarding the meaning of the word „project‟ in

the IP Resolution (which affected the scope of the IP‟s mandate).
79

E.g., Clark 2002, at 221-222; and see in general, Fox 2000. On panel proofing, also see note 25,

above.
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findings.80 Or consider Management‟s proposals to engage in discussion with the IP
on what „compliance‟ might mean in certain circumstances:
[i]n conducting EAs, the question of how much data is enough frequently arises, given the
need to make case-by-case judgments on the type and amount of data to be collected […]. In
the case of the pipeline, Management considered the trade-offs, because the data collected did
provide a sufficient basis for mitigative measures through the EASs and for monitoring. In the
context of the Pipeline Project, Management would welcome an occasion to exchange views
with the Inspection Panel on what should constitute adequate data collection.

81

Regardless of which of the two positions is a more accurate reflection of the
internal perception at the Bank, it can be said with certainty that the IP‟s
interpretations of the OP&P have come to serve as the benchmark for shaping PAP
and their representative‟s expectations concerning their rights vis-à-vis the Bank.

3.2

Enhancing enforcement potential through institutional

reforms of IAMs
A consistent criticism of the WBIP process has been the lack of formalized Panel and
Requester involvement in the development and implementation of Management
remedial action plans (i.e., strengthening of the „enforcement‟ elements of the
process).82 It is one matter to find, often pervasive, occurrences of non-compliance
with OP&P; it is another matter altogether to ensure that those specific instances are

80

Compare e.g., the MR in 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project and

Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (see MR to IR, Annex 1 – where Management „noted‟ the Panel‟s
findings of non-compliance in many instances, but concluded that there was „no action to be taken‟ or
that the Bank would „continue supervision‟ – see e.g., action numbers 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21,
22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 31), with later MRs such in 2004 Pakistan National Drainage Program Project
(e.g., in this case, Management acknowledged that categorizing the project as a „category B‟ for
environmental assessment purposes was „premature‟ and „that it would have been more appropriate to
categorize this as an EA category “A” project.‟ (MR, at para. 43)); and 2005 Cambodia Forest
Concession Management & Control Pilot Project (where „Management acknowledges that the project
did not succeed in adequately addressing the concerns of local communities and Indigenous Peoples.‟
(MR to IR, at para. 23)).
81

2002 Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, and Petroleum Environment Capacity

Enhancement Project, MR to IR, at para. 28 (also see para. 23 for another example).
82

See Horta 2002. This criticism is also echoed in the comment that new accountability mechanisms do

little to provide claimants with real redress or remedies – see e.g., Wellens 2002, at 266-267.
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remedied, and even more so if the non-compliance point to systemic policy failures.
In the case of the WBIP, no such enforcement role was foreseen for either the Panel
or the claimants. In fact, the Bank‟s Board has emphatically decided to stop Panel
involvement post the delivery of the Investigation Report (which had developed in
practice).83 Yet, practice has continued to evolve in a different direction – albeit at the
discretion of the Bank‟s Board. For instance, the Board has formally requested the
Panel to remain engaged in the remedial phase in controversial cases such as 2002
Paraguay / Argentina (Yacyretá) and 2004 India Mumbai Urban Road Transport;
while a recently implemented section on the IP‟s website („Post-Investigations
Progress Reports and Actions‟) list current IP post-investigation involvement in nine
cases.84
Over time, the other MDBs have enhanced the enforcement potential of their
respective IAM and the original complainants. The IFC‟s Compliance Advisory
Ombudsman, for example, is specifically tasked with an enforcement role,85 and the
IDB‟s accountability mechanism may get involved in post-investigation monitoring at
request of the Board,86 while the AfDB‟s IAM is permitted to make recommendations
regarding potential remedies, although it has no formal enforcement role.87

83

See 1999 Board Review Conclusions, at para. 16: „The Board should not ask the Panel for its view

on other aspects of the [Bank management] action plans nor would it ask the Panel to monitor the
implementation of the action plans.‟
84

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/PostInvestions_Progress_Rep
orts_and_actions_July_2010.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. The Panel‟s website also shows „follow up
report‟ in several other older cases – see e.g., 1995 Brazil Rondônia Natural Resources Management
Project (progress report in 1997); 1996 Bangladesh Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (progress
report in 1998); and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Project
(progress

report

in

2006)

–

available

at

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:2022160
6~menuPK:4766130~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html.
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See http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/compliance/.
Para. 72, Policy Establishing the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism of 17

February 2010, available at http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigationmechanism-mici,1752.html.
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Paras. 52(c) and 60, The Independent Review Mechanism, Operating Rules and Procedures of 16

June 2010, available at http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/.
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However, at this moment, recent institutional reforms of the EBRD‟s Project
Complaint Mechanism (PCM) appear to go furthest in enhancing the enforcement
potential of the IAM. For instance, in the course of processing a complaint the
„Project Complaints Mechanism Officer‟ (PCM Officer) can make an interim
recommendation to the relevant EBRD body to suspend Bank payments;88 in cases of
non-compliance findings, compliance review experts are specifically required to make
recommendations to
a. address the findings of non-compliance at the level of EBRD systems or procedures to
avoid a recurrence of such or similar occurrences; and/or
b. address the findings of non-compliance in the scope or implementation of the Project taking
account of prior commitments by the Bank or the Client in relation to the Project; and
c. monitor and report on the implementation of any recommended changes.

89

while the PCM Officer is specifically tasked with monitoring „the implementation of
the recommendations of the Compliance Review Report subject to the timetable and
estimate of human and financial resources as set in the Management Action Plan‟.90
Moreover, complainants are given the opportunity to comment on the Compliance
Review Report and the Management Action Plan, and those comments are also
included in the final set of reports ultimately submitted to the Bank‟s Board.91
Clearly, further research into this area is required – especially into the growing
body of „jurisprudence‟ of the IFC‟s CAO, the IDB‟s MICI, the ADB‟s AM, the
AfDB‟s IRM, and the EBRD‟s PCM – before any definitive conclusions can be
drawn. What is clear, however, is that the evolving enforcement role of the IAMs at
MDBs has the potential to further strengthen the normative development of the
OP&Ps, and to further clarify MDB obligations vis-à-vis a variety of stakeholders.

4.

Preliminary observations

This report provided an overview of the content, formulation, adoption, amendment
and enforcement of OP&P at the MDBs. It highlighted the impact of three recent
88
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25

developments that are strengthening the normative significance and enforcement
potential of the OP&P, namely: broadening stakeholder participation in OP&P
revision processes; „hardening‟ or legalization of OP&P through IAM compliance
procedures; and emerging enforcement potential of the IAMs.
This section will set out a few preliminary observations drawn from the report;
and explore potential implications for IO responsibility.
i)

All OP&P, in principle, are in the public domain and have become
increasingly accessible to the general public through their publication on the
internet. While this degree of transparency is commendable, locating complete
catalogues of OP&P on the websites of the MDBs is not necessarily a
straightforward exercise – and almost certainly not for all people affected by
MDB development projects (including their civil society allies) who
increasingly consult the OP&P as a means of ascertaining their „rights‟ against
the MDBs (Hunter 2003. at 204). Given the growing importance of the OP&P
for external parties, and not only for internal staff members and borrowers, the
MDBs should ensure that the OP&P are located in more prominent areas of
their websites – the layout of which, in fairness, continues to be improved on a
regular basis.

ii)

The MDBs have been making significant progress in facilitating broad
stakeholder participation in their OP&P review processes; however, such
participation remains at the discretion of the MDB, and has not been
formalized (or, „codified‟), for example, through the adoption of a „policy
about policies‟.92 We suggest that this should be a logical next step now that
the practice of stakeholder participation in OP&P reviews have become more
firmly embedded in the institutional culture.

iii)

The ongoing normative development of OP&P is fuelled by public
participation in review processes and by the ability of non-state actors to

92

To some extent, some policies establishing the IAMs would seem to be an exception – see e.g., para.

69 of the EBRD‟s Project Complaint Mechanism‟s Rules of Procedure: „The PCM will be reviewed by
the Board every three (3) years or as needed.‟ And see para. 99 of the IDB‟s Policy Establishing the
Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism: „Two (2) years after the effective date of the
Mechanism, the Board shall request an independent evaluation of the Mechanism. On the basis of such
evaluation, and any comments thereon from Management, the Board will assess the experience with
Mechanism.‟
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initiate the compliance procedures of IAMs. Both are driving the
strengthening of the obligatory nature of the OP&Ps and the clarification of
substantive and procedural MDB obligations – especially towards third parties
in a non-contractual relationship with them.
iv)

A key area for future development with regards to OP&P rule making
procedures, as well as the effective implementation / „operationalization‟ of
the O&P& at MDBs, concerns the further enhancement of the IAMs‟
enforcement role. Currently, their enforcement role, if it exists at all, is limited
to making recommendations and monitoring the implementation of the
remedial action plan developed by the Bank Management.

v)

The evolution of OP&P at the MDBs, and the role played by the IAMs in this
regard, potentially hold broader implications for ensuring IO responsibility,
and for international law as a whole. For instance:


Given the significance of MDBS in the international arena (the WB and IFC in
particular), current OP&P review processes may be developing rules for
public participation at the international level – „administrative‟ rules which
appear to be lacking or, at least underdeveloped in conventional international
law discourse.



The normative development of the substantive and procedural aspects of legal
concepts and constructs such as „consultation‟ and „compliance‟ through
IAMs enforcement processes, for instance, has potential value beyond the
MDB context.



Since the OP&P also deal with issues that raise important international law
questions – such as rights of indigenous people, compensation for
involuntarily resettled people, the responsibilities of actors for the
environmental consequences of their actions – their formulation and
interpretation can contribute to the development of international law on these
issues. It remains noticeable, however, that the IAMs continue to make scant
references to existing international legal standards and soft law – which,
arguably weakens its broader contribution to international law.



Since MDBs are not the only IOs that are engaged in actions that directly
affect the citizens of their member states (other examples are the UN‟s
operations relating to refugees, humanitarian assistance, governance), the
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example of the IAMs at multilateral development banks sets standards for
accountability and responsibility of IOs that has relevance for all IOs.
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7.

Appendix

7.1

Structured comparison of OP&P at MDBs

Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P
93

World Bank

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

Most operational policies and
procedures are issued “under the
authority of the [Bank‟s] President”,
by the relevant senior Bank
management member. Some policies,
such as the „Safeguard policies‟, are
Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems
discussed by the Board in draft format
to Address Environmental and Social before they are adopted by Bank
Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported management. (Shihata 2000, at 41-42)

Poverty reduction
Country assistance management
Lending eligibility and terms
Safeguard policies:

Inspection Panel (IP)
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)
Quality Assurance Group (QAG)
World
Bank's
Department
of
Institutional Integrity (INT)

Projects
Environmental Assessment
Environmental Action Plans
Natural Habitats
Water Resources Management
Pest Management
Indigenous Peoples
Social Assessment
Indigenous Peoples Plan
Physical Cultural Resources

93

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21807601~menuPK:5068208~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html.
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

Involuntary Resettlement
Gender and Development
Forests
Safety of Dams

Bank financing
Legal aspects of lending
Emergency and other lending
instruments
Investment lending and
the
Montreal Protocol
Procurement
Disbursement
Sanctions
Debt
Supervision
External resource mobilization and
aid coordination
Inspection
Panel
and
communications with individual
executive directors
Information Disclosure
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Institution
International
Finance
Corporation94

Main policy areas covered by Adoption

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

OP&P

procedures

Disclosure of information
Social and environmental
sustainability policy95
Performance standards:96

Compiled by internal working
committees;
Submitted to Board of Executive
Director's
Committee
on
Development Effectiveness (CODE)
Adopted (and amendments approved)
by IFC‟s Board of Executive
Directors – no formal participationrelated or consultation requirements.

Social and Environmental Assessment
and Management Systems
Labor and Working Conditions
Pollution Prevention and Abatement
Community Health, Safety and
Security
Land Acquisition and Involuntary
Resettlement
Biodiversity Conservation and
Sustainable Natural Resource
Management
Indigenous Peoples
Cultural Heritage

Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman
Independent Evaluation Group
World
Bank's
Department
of
Institutional Integrity (INT)

IFC’s exclusions list97

94

http://www.ifc.org/disclosure.

95

Defining IFC responsibilities.

96

Defining IFC borrower („client‟) responsibilities. The disclosure of information policy, social and environmental sustainable policy and the performance standards together

constitute the IFC‟s „sustainability framework‟.
97

Listing project types the IFC are not allowed to finance.
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Institution
Inter-American
Development Bank98

Main policy areas covered by Adoption

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

OP&P

procedures

General Operational Policies:

Compiled by several internal working
committees;
Adopted (and amendments approved)
by IDB‟s Board of Executive
Directors – no formal participationrelated or consultation requirements.

Disclosure of information
Operations programming
Lending policies
Technical cooperation
Procurement of goods and services
Subregional financial institutions

Office of Institutional Integrity
Independent Consultation and
Investigation Mechanism (MICI)
Office of Evaluation and Oversight

Sector Policies:
Multisectoral Policies:
Preinvestment
Intraregional Export Financing for
Goods and Services
Financing of exports through the
Venezuelan trust fund
Environment and Safeguards
Compliance
Natural Disaster Risk Management
Use of Intermediate or Light Capital
Technologies
Social Entrepreneurship Program
Maintenance and Conservation of
Physical Works and Equipment
Public Utilities
Subloan Interest Rates
Involuntary Resettlement

98

http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/operations-policies-of-the-inter-american-development-bank,6127.html.
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

Information Age Technologies and
Development

Productive sectors
Economic infrastructure sectors
Social infrastructure sectors
Integrated development programs
Policies for special areas:
Women in Development
Indigenous Peoples

Asian Development Country classification and country
Bank99
focus
Regional and subregional
cooperation
Sector and thematic policies:

Adopted (and amendments approved) Operations Evaluation Department
by ADB‟s Board of Executive Accountability Mechanism
Directors – no formal participationrelated or consultation requirements.

Poverty Reduction
Gender and Development
Incorporation of Social Dimensions
into ADB Operations
Governance
Anticorruption
Enhancing ADB's role in Combating
Money Laundering and the Financing
of Terrorism
99

http://www.adb.org/About/policies-strategies.asp.
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

Business products and instruments
Partnerships
Safeguard policies
Analyses
Financial
Project administration:
Project Performance Management
System
Consultants
Procurement
Loan Covenants
Effectiveness of the Loan Agreement
Disbursement
Project
Accounting,
Financial
Reporting, and Auditing

Independent evaluation
ADB Accountability Mechanism
Internal Audit
Public Communications
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

European Bank for Public Information Policy
Reconstruction and
Project Complaint Mechanism
Development100
(Independent Recourse
Mechanism)
Environmental and Social Policy
Environmental Procedures
Sub-sectoral environmental
guidelines
Procurement Policies and Rules
Internal Purchasing Policy and
Procedures
Anti-terrorist statement
Common performance assessment
report
Moving transition forward
Strategic Portfolio Review
Addressing staff grievances
Business plan and budget
Capital resources review

100

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/policies.shtml.

101

Also issue Anti-corruption reports

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures
Adopted by Board of Executive Project Complaint Mechanism –
Directors?
Office of the Chief Compliance
Officer101
(previously: Independent Recourse
Mechanism)
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

EBRD and ethnic minorities
Political aspects of the EBRD
mandate
Fraud and corruption
African Development Debt Management
Bank102
Guidelines and Procedures (e.g.):

Adopted by Board of Executive Quality Assurance & Results Dept
Directors?
(OPQR)
Operations Evaluation
Information Note on the Checklist for
Independent Review Mechanism
Mainstreaming Gender and Climate
Auditor General‟s Office
Change in Projects
Checklist for Gender Mainstreaming
in the Water and Sanitation Sector
Policy Guidelines and Procedures for
Emergency Relief Assistance
2009
Environmental
Review
Procedures for Private Sector
Operations
of
the
African
Development Bank
Environmental and Social Assessment
Procedures for AfDB Public Sector
Operations - June 2001
Environmental and Social Assessment
Procedures

102

http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/policy-documents/.
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Institution

Main policy areas covered by Adoption
OP&P

and

amendment Enforcement mechanisms

procedures

Handbook
on
Stakeholder
Consultation and Participation in
AfDB Operations

Policy on Cross-Cutting Issues
Sectoral Policy
Special Initiatives
Procurement
Integrity and Anti-Corruption
Information Disclosure
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